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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
RICKY ANGILAU,
Petitioner/Appellant,
-vsSupreme Court No. 20090677 SC
STATE OF UTAH, SHERIFF JAMES M.
WINDER, AND THE HONORABLE
VERNICE TREASE,
Respondents/Appellees.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to
Article VIII, section 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. section 78A3-102(i)(2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES/ PRESERVATION
1.

Does the pretrial detention of a direct-file juvenile in a jail that does

not comply with the juvenile standards as promulgated by the Division of
Juvenile Justice Services violate Utah Code? This issue was preserved in the
trial court (E.g., R. 10-14, 201-06).
2.

Does the pretrial detention of a direct-file juvenile in a jail violate the

Utah and/or United States Constitutions? This issue was preserved in the
trial court. (E.g. R. 16-19, 209-13).

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review "in a 65B(d) extraordinary writ case is abuse of
discretion, State v. Henriod, 2006 UT 11, ^ 4, 131 P.3d 232, Although, "a mistake
of law may constitute an abuse of discretion." Id. Additionally, since statutes
carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, doubts are resolved in favor of
constitutionality. See State v. MohU 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). Finally, the
court's findings of facts are reviewed for clear error. See Taylor v. Warden, 905
P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner's statement of the case accurately reflects the nature,
proceedings, and disposition of this case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 26, 2009, prosecutors filed an Information in the Third District
Court under Utah Code section 78A-6-701 charging Petitioner/Appellant Ricky
Angilau (hereafter, "Angilau") with murder, obstructing justice, carrying a
concealed dangerous weapon, and possession of a firearm in a school. (See R.
46). Angilau was 16 years old at the time of murder. (See R. 542). The court
remanded him to the custody of the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Complex
("Jail"). (See R. 543). Angilau remains a detainee in the Jail, where he is being
fed, clothed, and provided the opportunity to meet with counsel. (R. 539).
Angilau has not been physically attacked or abused. Id. Angilau has been
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provided with opportunities for education, family visits, recreation, and clergy
visits. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Based on the current statutory scheme, which is "presumed to be
constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown," Angilau's incarceration is
lawful and mandatory.1
Although the Utah Department of Human Services has promulgated
standards for the detention of juveniles, those standards are inapplicable to the Jail
since the Department does not have the statutory authority to create rules
applicable to adult jails. This is supported both by Utah Code and decisions from
this Court.
Further, Angilau's detention in the Salt Lake County Jail violates neither
his rights under the Utah Constitution nor the United States Constitution.
Finally, Angilau has not presented a sufficiently compelling argument to
overrule this Court's previous rulings and create a right under the Utah
Constitution for all juveniles to be tried in the juvenile court system.
I.

ANGILAU'S INCARCERATION IS LAWFUL UNDER THE UTAH
CODE.
A.

The Division of Juvenile Justice Services Does Not Have
Jurisdiction Over Angilau and Cannot Detain Him.

The Division of Juvenile Justice Services (DJJS) has no jurisdiction over
Angilau, and consequently cannot lawfully detain him. DJJS has "jurisdiction of
1

Matter ofBaer's Estate, 562 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977)
3

all youth committed to it pursuant to section 78A-6-117." Utah Code Ann. §
62A-7-102 (2008) (emphasis added). Juvenile courts are established separate and
apart from the DJJS. Id.

Section 78A-6-117 discusses the options available to

juvenile courts in adjudicating cases brought to them when "a minor is found to
come within the provisions of 78A-6-103," including committing the juvenile to
the DJJS "for secure confinement." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-117(l)(a) and
(2)(d)(i) (2008).
Under this statutory scheme, DJJS has no jurisdiction or authority over a
youth until the youth is "committed to it" by a juvenile court after the "minor is
found to come within the provisions of 78A-6-103." Section 78A-6-103 explains
that the juvenile court has jurisdiction over all youth charged with violating state
or federal, or local criminal law, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law...." Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-6-103(l)(a) (2009).
Section 78A-6-701 specifically removes from the juvenile courts'
jurisdiction a select subset of children who commit particular crimes:
The district court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age or older
charged by information or indictment with an offense
which would be murder or aggravated murder if
committed by an adult....
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a) (2008). Angilau, who is 16 years old, was
charged with murder. Therefore, as "otherwise provided by law," Angilau is
under the original jurisdiction of the district court, not the juvenile court.

4

Consequently, Angilau cannot be committed to the jurisdiction of the DJJS and
cannot be held in its detention centers.
B.

State Law and this Court's Decision in State v. Mohi Require
Angilau's Detention in Jail.
The Legislature allows for children charged with certain criminal acts to be

housed in adult jails. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(2)(a) (children
charged as serious youth offenders under section 78A-6-702 or certified youth
under section 78A-6-703 "may be detained in a jail or other place of detention
used for adults"); section 78A-6-113(11) (a minor held as a serious youth offender
or as a certified youth "may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used
for adults charged with crime").
In State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995), this Court confirmed that youth
offenders charged as adults must be housed in adult jails. Mohfs co-defendants,
Lundquist and Chaides, were certified as adults to stand trial for aggravated
burglary, aggravated robbery, and theft of a vehicle. Id. at 994. Prior to trial, they
were in the custody of the Utah County Jail pursuant to Utah Code Ann. section
78-3a-30(9) which stated, "A child held for criminal proceedings under section 783a-25 may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults charged
with crime." Id. at 1005. The defendants in Mohi argued that the statute allowed
the district court discretion to place them in either a juvenile detention facility or
an adult jail. Id. at 1006.
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Relying on the phrase "may be detained in a jail or other place of detention
used for adults charged with crime," this Court held that the district court did not
have discretion to put Lundquist and Chaides in a youth correctional facility,
rather, it only had discretion to put them in jail or another place of detention used
for adults. Id.
This language from Utah Code section 78-3a-30(9), "may be detained in a
jail or other place of detention used for adults charged with crime," is unchanged
since this Court's decision in Mohi. In the 1996 General Session, the Legislature
re-codified section 78-3a-30(9) as section 78-3a-509(ll), leaving untouched the
language "may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults
charged with crime." Subsequently, in the 1997 General Session, section 78-3 a509 was renumbered as 78-3a-114 again, maintaining the language interpreted in
Mohi.
In the 2008 General Session, the Legislature again altered the statute. In
House Bill 78, section 78-3a-114 was renumbered as the current section 78A-6113, leaving the Mohi language untouched. In House Bill 63, the Legislature
tinkered with liability for parents of delinquent minors, but again left alone the
language interpreted in Mohi.
If the Legislature does not change the language of a statutory provision
after a court interprets it, the Legislature must be satisfied with the Court's
interpretation. Christensen v. Inds. Comm'n, 642 P.2d 755, 756-57 (Utah 1982).
Here, the Legislature had four separate opportunities to excise the provision
6

interpreted in Mohi, "may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for
adults charged with crime," but left the language untouched. The unwillingness to
alter this language implies the Legislature was satisfied with the Court's
interpretation that juveniles charged as adults must be detained in adult jails. See
id. Since this Court's decision in Mohi allows for the detention of juveniles in
adult jails, and since the Legislature failed to alter the key language authorizing
such detention, Angilau's argument that his incarceration is unlawful is without
merit.
C.

The Plain Meaning of the Direct-File Statute is Sufficient
Authorization to House Angilau in Jail.
Utah's direct-file statute grants exclusive original jurisdiction to the district

courts over all persons 16 and older charged with murder. See Utah Code Ann. §
78A-6-70L Under this provision, if prosecutors file charges against a juvenile
sixteen years or older for murder, they must file the information directly in the
district court rather than in juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701; see
also In re A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Ut. App. 1997) (stating, in dicta, that under
the direct-file statute, the prosecutor "must file in district court"). Angilau argues
that direct-file juveniles may not be housed in the Jail since sections 62A-7201(2)(a) and 78A-6-113(11), which authorize the detention of specific juveniles
in the Jail, do not mention direct-file juveniles under section 78A-6-701.
However, the absence of the direct-file statute, section 78A-6-701, from the
juvenile incarceration statutes in sections 62A-7-201(2)(a) and 78A-6-113(11)

7

does not create an ambiguity or question regarding where direct-file juveniles are
to be detained prior to trial. The legislative history bears this out. In 1994, the
direct-file statute read as follows:
If a grand jury returns an indictment on the charge or a
county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general
files a criminal information, the juvenile court is
divested of jurisdiction under section 78-3a-16. The
charge shall be made and the proceedings regarding
the charge shall be conducted in every respect as if the
juvenile were an adult.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6)(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
In the 1995 General Session, the Legislature recodified the direct-file
statute and amended it to provide that the district courts "shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction" over youths who are charged with murder. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3a-16(l) (1995). In the numerous recodifications since, the Legislature has
not altered this language. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701 (2009).
Under the 1994 statute, the juvenile court had to be "divested" of
jurisdiction. Therefore, in 1994, it was unclear whether direct-file juveniles
initially fell within the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. In 1995, the Legislature
rectified any potential discrepancy, entirely removing direct-file juveniles from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court system, including all of its procedures, standards,
and hearings. The Legislature placed direct-file youths in the adult system. This

2

S«?78-3a-16(l):
"Jurisdiction of juvenile court -Jurisdiction of district court.
8

includes detention within the jail, the only place, barring mental illness, where
adult pretrial detainees are held in the adult system. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1006
(holding that the county jail is the only possible place of adult detention within the
state).
In contrast to the prosecution of juveniles under the direct-file statute,
prosecutors charging juveniles under sections 78A-6-702 and 703 must prosecute
their cases in juvenile court before jurisdiction over the juvenile is transferred to
the district court. Until certified as adults under subsections 702 or 703, the
juvenile court, and consequently DJJS, have jurisdiction over the juveniles.
The statute Angilau relies on excludes youths charged under sections 78A6-702 and 703 from the restriction on detention "once they are charged by
information in the district court." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-201(2)(a) (2008).
Although the direct-file statute is not mentioned in this exception, the specific
exclusion of direct-file juveniles from section 62A-7-201(2)(a) is simply not
necessary since they are charged in district court from the outset, and never fall
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.

(1) The adult judicial system shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment
with:
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if
committed by and adult: or
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if
the juvenile has been previously committed to a secure facility as
defined in section 62A-7-101."
9

Similarly, Utah Code section 78A-6-113 discusses the pretrial placement of
minors charged in the juvenile system. Subsection 113(11) clarifies that these
youths are subject to the adult system, including adult detention, once properly
certified through the required procedures. Again, no specific mention of directfile juveniles is made because they are never subjected to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile courts.
In short, the Legislature does not mention section 78A-6-701 in section
62A-7-201(2)(a) or section 78A-6-113(11) because such language is unnecessary.
By virtue of the district court having original jurisdiction, a direct-file juvenile is
to be held in an adult detention facility.
D.

Housing Direct-file Juveniles in a Juvenile Detention Center While
Housing Serious Youth Offenders and Certified Juveniles in Jail is an
Absurd Result.
Angilau's argument that the plain meaning of sections 62A-7-201(2)(a) and

78A-6-113(11) exclude direct-file juveniles from incarceration within adult
detention facilities leads to a result "so absurd that the legislative body which
authorized the legislation could not have intended it...." In re Z C., 2007 UT 54,
TJ13, 165 P.3d 1206, 1210. In Z.C., this court found that the plain meaning of the
statute allowed prosecutors to charge two children who engage in "consensual"
sexual behavior with sexual abuse of a child. See id. at f 5. To avoid this illogical
result, this Court held that "a court should not follow the literal language of a
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result." Angilau argues that, since
neither section 62A-7-201(2)(a) nor section 78A-6-113(11) reference cases the
10

direct-file statute under section 78A-6-701, the Legislature intended that direct-file
juveniles could not be held in adult detention facilities. See Angilau's Brief at 14.
This contention is without merit.
Legislative intent is determined by reading statutes in harmony with related
statutory provisions. Board of Educ. of Jordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy, 2004 UT 37, Tf
9, 94 P.3d 234; Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, % 7, 162 P.3d 1099. Further, "the absurd
results doctrine functions to preserve legislative intent when it is narrowly
applied." Z.C., 2007 UT at f 12. Sections 78A-6-701 to -703 govern when
juveniles may be tried as adults. Subsection 701 deals with juveniles, sixteen to
seventeen years old, who commit murder, aggravated murder, or are repeat
offenders. Subsection 702 deals with juveniles, sixteen to seventeen years old
who are charged with violating a list of dangerous crimes. Subsection 703 allows
the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction after weighing a list of factors. In each, the
juvenile court is either divested of jurisdiction over the charged youth or never has
jurisdiction in the first place.
As discussed above, once jurisdiction over a juvenile is transferred, DJJS,
the operators of juvenile detention facilities in Utah, no longer has jurisdiction. See
1(A) supra. Angilau's argument would lead to the result that youth charged as
adults under subsections 702 and 703 would be detained in adult jails, while
youths in 701 charged with murder would be released since DJJS lacks jurisdiction
to detain them.

11

Tellingly, Angilau provides no support for his assertion that the Legislature
intended to remove direct-file juveniles from adult jails in order to compensate
them for the absence of judicial assessment prior to being charged with a crime in
district court. See Angilau's Brief at 14. There is, however, legislative history to
suggest the Legislature had a contrary intent.
In 1996, section 78A-6-113(11) was codified as 78-3a-30(l 1). In the 1996
General Session of the Legislature, through Senate Bill 44, the Legislature
renumbered section 78-3a-30(l 1) as section 79-3a-509(l 1). During this
recodification, the Legislature left out any reference to the newly recodified directfile statute, while specifically mentioning the serious youth offender and
certification statutes. During the floor debates, Representative Ellertson stated that
due to the massive size of the bill, it was likely that very few had read it in its
entirety. See Comments of Rep. Ellertson, House floor debate on S.B. 44, January
25, 1996. Rep. Ellertson further explains that the recodification done by S.B. 44
was meant to organize and recodify the juvenile justice code. Id. Rep. Ellertson
later assured the Legislature that "This is simply a recodification, there are no
substantive changes .... You'll have to trust me on this, there are no substantive
changes." Id. (emphasized in recording).
In light of this representation, it is impossible to impute to the Legislature
the intent to remove youths charged with murder from adult detention facilities,
while leaving youth who commit less serious crimes in adult facilities. Far from
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being a simple recodification or statutory housekeeping, the decision to not
incarcerate juveniles charged with murder would be substantive and significant.
Rather, the reasonable and harmonious reading of these statutory provisions is that
the Legislature did not intend to remove direct-file juveniles from pretrial adult
incarceration. Therefore, the district court has jurisdiction over those juveniles,
and consequently their detention in an adult jail is lawful.
II.

THE JUVENILE STANDARDS ARE INAPPLICABLE TO
JAILS.
The Legislature has the power to authorize agencies such as DJJS, a

division of the Department of Human Services, to promulgate rules. See § 63G-3102(2). Any rule the agency promulgates must be within the authority that the
Legislature expressly granted in the authorizing statute. See Williams v. Pub. Serv.
Comm V?, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988); West Jordan v. Department of Employment
Security, 656 P.2d 411, 412 (Utah 1982). DJJS is not statutorily authorized to
promulgate rules governing the custody of persons older than fifteen years of age
who have been charged with murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-102 (2008).
As discussed earlier, DJJS only has jurisdiction over youths committed to
its custody through the juvenile courts. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-7-102. The
Legislature reiterates this point when, discussing the duties of DJJS, it states, "The
division is responsible for all youth offenders committed to it by juvenile courts
for secure confinement...." § 62A-7-104(1) (emphasis added). The Legislature
then tasked DJJS with establishing and maintaining uall detention and secure
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facilities..."

§ 62A-7-104(2)(b).

Detention is defined as "secure detention,"

which in turn is defined as a "facility operated by or under contract with the
division" for pre-trial detainees who are juveniles. § 62A-7-104(7) & (19). The
Legislature authorized DJJS to "set minimum standards for [detention and secure]
facilities." § 62A-7-104(2)(b).
Angilau's argument would have this Court improperly extend the
Legislature's specific grant of authority to allow DJJS to set standards for adult
jails. Detention facilities are the facilities used by DJJS to detain juveniles. They
are not jails, lockups, cells, or other places used for the detention of adults. If the
Legislature intended to authorize DJJS to promulgate rules governing all places
where juveniles may be detained, it would have included jails, lockups, cells used
for persons 18 years of age or older, adult facilities, or other places used for the
detention of adults with "detention facilities" in sections 62A-7-201(6)(b) and
62A-7-104(2)(b).
Angilau relies on section 62A-7-201(2)(b) to support the claim that the
Legislature authorized DJJS to promulgate standards for juveniles held in adult
facilities. However, Angilau ignores Subsection 62A-7-201(6)(b), which specifies
that "the division shall provide standards of custody or detention under
Subsections (2)(b), (3), and (4)...." Noticeably absent from this list is subsection
(2)(a), which states that children charged as adults under sections 78A-6-702 &
703 "may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults." § 62A7-201(2)(a).
14

Interpreting Subsection 62A-7-201(6)(b)'s plain language together with
related provisions, it is clear that the Legislature did not authorize DJJS to
promulgate rules governing the custody of juveniles in jail or other places used for
the detention of adults.
III.

THE JAIL IS NOT SUBJECTING ANGILAU TO UNNECESSARY
RIGOR.
A.

Angilau's Treatment is not Clearly Excessive.

The Jail is not subjecting Angilau to unnecessary rigor. "Unnecessary
rigor" is defined as "treatment which is clearly excessive or deficient and
unjustified." Bott v. Deland, 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 1996). More recently, this
Court clarified that unnecessary rigor is "treatment that is (1) clearly excessive or
deficient and (2) unjustified, not merely the frustrations, inconveniences, and
irritations that are common to prison life." Dexter v. Bosko, 2008 UT 29, ^|19, 184
P.3d 592 (quoting Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 741 (Utah 1996)). Examples of
clearly excessive treatment include the ball and chain, the continuous use of
shackles, intentional physical abuse, assault and battery, and possibly strict
silence. See Dexter, 2008 UT 29 atffl[14n.l6, 15. Angilau is not being abused, he
is not forced to remain silent and he is not subjected to excessive treatment. See
R. at 538-39; see also Memorandum Decision and Order at 12, (attached in
Addendum A). Additionally, Angilau has had "opportunities for education, family
visits, recreation, and clergy/religious visits." (R. 539).
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The only rigors Angilau is subjected to are "merely the frustrations,
inconveniences, and irritation that are common to prison life." Dexter, 2008 UT at
Tf 19. Angilau has failed to show his incarceration rises to the level of
"unnecessary rigor" as defined by this Court Bott and Dexter, since he has failed
to show the requisite excessive treatment.
B.

The State has a Legitimate and Compelling Interest in Detaining
Angilau in the Jail.

Even if this Court finds that Angilau's detention in the Jail constitutes
"rigor," it is not "unnecessary" because the need to protect other inmates, the
community, and children in detention facilities justifies his detention in the Jail.
The State has a legitimate and compelling interest in protecting people from
potential harm inflicted by juveniles accused of committing extremely violent
offenses. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984). Only juveniles older
than fifteen years of age charged with extremely violent offenses can be detained
in jail or other place used for the detention of adults. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6701 to -703. In fact, the Legislature has mandated that these juveniles be detained
in adult facilities while they await trial. See supra I.
The Legislature's purpose in requiring certain violent juveniles to be
detained in adult facilities is to protect children being detained in detention
facilities and the public at large. See Utah Code § 78A-6-102; Mohi, 901 P.2d at
1006. There is more security at adult facilities than detention facilities preventing
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both the juvenile awaiting trial as an adult from escaping and from injuring other
inmates.
Furthermore, detaining juveniles charged with violent offenses in adult
facilities is necessary to protect juveniles who are in juvenile detention facilities,
which

house

children

as

young

as

ten

years

old.

See

DJJS,

www.iis.utah.gov/detention.htm. Housing juveniles older than fifteen who have
shown a propensity to commit extremely violent acts in the same facility as
children ten years of age would be unwise, dangerous, and would expose DJJS and
the State of Utah to potential liability. Adult facilities are better equipped to
handle violent juvenile offenders who are older than fifteen. It also is safer for
other inmates, the community, and young children in detention facilities.
Since the State has a compelling interest in detaining Angilau at the jail, his
detention is not unnecessary and therefore does not violate the "unnecessary rigor"
provision of the Utah Constitution.
IV.

REQUIRING ANGILAU TO BE DETAINED IN THE JAIL DOES
NOT VIOLATE UTAH'S UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS
PROVISION OR HIS EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES,
A.

The Direct-file Statute Does Not Violate the Uniform Operation
of Laws Provision.

The direct-file statute does not violate Utah's uniform operation of laws
provision. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701. Statutes that create

different

classifications and mandate disparate treatment among those classifications do not
violate Utah's uniform operation of laws provision if "the legislature had any
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reasonable objective that warrants the disparity."

Mohi, 901 P.2d at 997.

Certainly juveniles tried as adults are treated differently than juveniles who remain
in the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. Id. at 998-99.
In Mohi, this Court held that a statutory scheme granting prosecutors
unfettered discretion to decide whether to file capital or first-degree felony charges
against juveniles in district or juvenile court violated Utah's uniform operation of
laws provision. Id. at 1002. It struck down the statutory scheme not because
treating violent juveniles as adults violated Utah's uniform operation of law
provision, but because the Legislature gave the prosecutor unbridled discretion as
to which violent juveniles should be treated as adults. Id. at 998-99.
After MohU the Legislature divested prosecutors of all discretion as to
where to file charges against persons 16 years and older charged with murder.
Angilau's argument that the direct-file statute gives prosecutors "unfettered
discretion to choose between filing an information in adult court, or a petition in
juvenile court" is flawed. See Angilau's Brief at 41-42. Since the statute gives the
district court "exclusive original jurisdiction," it could not be clearer on where the
prosecutor must file charges of murder against persons sixteen years and older.
The phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" is similarly used in the juvenile
code. See § 78A-6-103(l)(a). Certainly there is no argument that prosecutors have
discretion to file charges against a fifteen-year-old for robbery directly in district
court. Since the direct file statute grants "exclusive original jurisdiction" to the
district court, the prosecutor had no more discretion to file charges against Angilau
18

in the juvenile court than he would to file charges against the fifteen-year-old in
district court. There is simply no option and no discretion on the part of the
prosecutor to file the charges in any other court under section 78A-6-701. All that
remains is the discretion to file charges based on the evidence, which "is protected
by traditional notions of prosecutor discretion." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003.
In addition to divesting prosecutors of the discretion struck down in Mohi,
the Legislature has reasonable objectives that warrant trying certain juveniles in
district court and detaining them pretrial in adult facilities. This Court has said
that the State has "a legitimate need to try certain violent juveniles as adults...."
Mohi, 901 P.2d at 999. The Legislature's statutory directives as to which juveniles
may be tried in district court directly furthers that legitimate need.
States have a legitimate and compelling interest in protecting people from
potential harm inflicted by juveniles accused of committing extremely violent
offenses. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264 (1984). Only juveniles older
than fifteen charged with extremely violent offenses, including murder, can be
charged directly in district court. Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701.
Therefore, section 78A-6-701, which mandates direct filing in the district
courts for juveniles who are older than fifteen and are charged with murder be
tried as adults, does not violate Utah's uniform operation of laws provision.
Prosecutors do not have the discretion to decide which juveniles to direct-file in
district court.

There is a legitimate need to prosecute juveniles who commit

violent felonies in district court. Concerns for public safety and the safety of
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children in the juvenile detention facilities mandate that certain violent juveniles
be detained with adults as they await trial. Finally, a prosecutor's discretion as to
which charges to file is necessary to prevent placing a massive financial burden on
the public.
B.

Requiring Angilau to Be Detained in the Jail does not Violate
Equal Protection Rights.

Detaining Angilau in the Jail does not violate his equal protection rights.
Unless it involves a fundamental right or suspect class, a statutory scheme
authorizing the disparate treatment of similarly situated people must only be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Gardner v. Board of County
Com'rs, 2008 UT 6, TJ39, 178 P.3d 893. Juveniles accused of murder are not
members of a suspect class. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (age-based classifications are not suspect); Christopher v.
State, 143 P.3d 685, 708 (Kan. App. 2006) (stating juvenile offenders are not
members of a suspect class); In re Chappell, 2005 -Ohio- 6451, ^|37, 843 N.E.2d
823 (holding juveniles are not members of a suspect class); In re Hegney, 138
Wash. App. 511, ^j32, 158 P.3d 1193 (holding juveniles are not members of a
suspect class); In re Jeremy P., 2005 WI App 13, T|28, 692 N.W.2d 311 (holding
children are not a suspect class). Therefore, Angilau's detention does not violate
his equal protection rights if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
interest.
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As previously discussed at length, the State of Utah's interest in protecting
other inmates, the community and children in detention facilities is not only
legitimate, it is compelling. Supra III, IV(A). Therefore, Angilau's equal
protection rights have not been violated.
V.

ANGILAU'S DETENTION IN THE JAIL IS NOT PUNITIVE AND
DOES NOT DEPRIVE HIM OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
Angilau's detention in the Jail is not punitive, and thus does not violate his

due process rights. When evaluating an allegation that a pretrial detention violates
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the proper question is
whether the conditions of confinement amount to punishment. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).

If a "particular condition or restriction of pretrial

detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not,
without more, amount to 'punishment.'" Id. at 539.
Section 78A-6-701 does not evince an express intent to punish juveniles
older than fifteen who are accused of committing murder. As discussed at length,
the Legislature mandated that juveniles older than fifteen years of age who are
accused of extremely violent offenses be detained in adult facilities for the
protection of the community, inmates, and children in detention facilities. Supra
III. and IV(A). Protecting people from juveniles accused of extremely violent
offenses is a legitimate and compelling state interest. Id. County jails are better
equipped to further this interest. Id.
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Therefore, Angilau's detention in the Jail is not punitive and does not
violate his Due Process rights.
VI.

DIRECT-FILE DEFENDANTS HAVE NO RIGHT TO TREATMENT
AS JUVENILES.3
Angilau's request for this Court to recognize a new constitutional right

should be dismissed since it was neither briefed nor argued at the district court.
This Court has held that that "[a]bsent plain error or extraordinary circumstances,
we do not address issues raised for the first time on appeal." Board of Trustees v.
Keystone Conversions, LLC, 2004 UT 84, If 32 n.8, 103 P.3d 686, 694. Angilau
has argued neither exception here and cannot do so for the first time in any reply
brief.
Should this Court reach the merits of this argument, prior decisions state
that "juveniles have no constitutional right to be tried as juveniles." See Mohi, 901
P.2d at 1005; see also State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 399 (Utah 1989) ("A juvenile
has no right to treatment in the juvenile system or to be specially treated as a
juvenile delinquent instead of a criminal offender.") (footnote and quotation
omitted). Angilau argues, for the first time on appeal, that this Court should
"recognize that all children do have a constitutional right to be prosecuted in
juvenile court," a finding that would require this Court to overturn its prior
precedent. Angilau's Brief at 37.

To the extent this issue is further briefed and discussed by the Attorney General's
Office in Supreme Court Docket # 20090538, the Sheriff directs this Court's
attention to any additional arguments presented there.
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A party requesting that this Court overturn its prior precedent has "a
substantial burden of persuasion." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah
1994), cert, den W 513 U.S. 1115 (1994). A court will overrule its own precedent
only in limited circumstances where the court is "'clearly convinced that the rule
was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and
that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent....'" State v.
Bennett, 2000 UT 34, f 8, 999 P.2d 1 (quoting Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399)
(additional quotations and citation omitted).4
Such limited circumstances do not exist in this case. Angilau offers no
supportable argument that the juvenile system in this State is anything other than a
legislative creation and provides no other legal basis for finding that he has a
constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile. See Angilau Brief at 36-41. He
simply argues that precedent contrary to his position should be overturned, arguing
the decision to file directly in adult court and the consequences thereof require the
same judicial scrutiny and constitutional protection that is available to decisions to
transfer a juvenile from juvenile court to adult court. See id. at 37. His argument

4

Although not mentioned in his request for this new constitutional right, Angilau
goes to great lengths at the outset of his Brief to discuss the recent case of Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Angilau's Brief at 8-9. However, Roper disposed
of a question vastly different than the issue before this Court. There, the Supreme
Court wrestled with the appropriateness of the death penalty for crimes committed
by juveniles. Here, the issues are the right of a juvenile to always be charged in
juvenile court and the pretrial incarceration of juveniles, not the punishment in
sentencing.
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does not establish any error in this Court's precedent, and he identifies no relevant
changing conditions that render the precedent unsound.
Angilau points to this Court's acknowledgment in Mohi of authority from
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals suggesting that a state's attempt to treat all
juveniles as adults might warrant federal constitutional review. See Angilau ys
Brief at. at 36 (citing Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1001 n.14, 1003 n.19, 1005 n.24) (citing
Kelleyv. Kaiser, 991 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1993)) (emphasis added). Specifically,
Angilau argues that the above cited footnotes, combined with the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Kelley, stand for the proposition that "once a state creates a juvenile
court system, the federal constitution requires a Kent hearing...." Angilau Brief at
36. However, Angilau overstates this Court's findings in Mohi.
In Mohi, this court specifically stated that if the Legislature chooses "to
have all members of a certain group of violent juveniles (such as repeat offenders,
those who use guns, etc.) tried as adults, it is free to do so." Mohi, 901 P.2d at
1003. However, in a footnote this Court warned that the Legislature's attempts to
"try all juveniles as adults without any opportunity for review may raise federal
constitutional questions" under Kelley and Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541
(1996); Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003 n. 19 (emphasis added). The statutory scheme in
question here simply does not fall into the perilous waters warned of in MohVs
footnote 19 since Utah's current direct-file statute applies only to a very select
group of violent juveniles. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701. Other juveniles
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charged with crimes who end up in adult court are afforded a hearing prior to the
transfer of jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-702 to -703.
The fact remains that in Mohi, this Court recognized that the Legislature
could remove a class of individuals from the category of "juvenile offender"
without being required to grant those persons the same rights as those who are
prosecuted in juvenile court. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1005; see also Bell, 785 P.2d
at 399. So long as the direct-file statue is constitutional {see Argument IV(A),
supra), Angilau is not entitled to the same treatment and protections afforded
juveniles whose cases commence in the juvenile courts. See Mohi, 901 P.2d at
1005;5e//785P.2dat399.
Angilau does suggest a number of provisions under the Utah Constitution
that this Court might use to create the requested right. See Angilau Brief at 36-41.
However these suggestions are based on the same constitutional arguments
previously addressed in this brief. See supra III, IV, and V. Since the arguments
failed above, they fare no better in his argument to create the right for a juvenile to
be tried in the juvenile system.
Additionally, Angilau raises two new constitutional provisions not
addressed above.5 First, Angilau argues that Article VI, section 26 of the Utah
Constitution might provide an adequate basis for the new right. See Angilau Brief
at 40. This provision states, "No private or special law shall be enacted where a
5

Angilau's arguments relative to these constitutional provisions were not
addressed at the lower court and should consequently be dismissed by this Court.
See supra at IV.
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general law can be applicable." Utah Const, art. VI, § 26. This Court has stated
that "in essence, ... the special laws ban [is] the flip side of the uniform operation
of the laws command." Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634,
645 (Utah 1986). Consequently, "[i]f a law satisfies the requirement of article I,
section 24, that all laws of "a general nature shall have uniform operation," it will
not violate Article VI, section 26." Id. As discussed above, the current direct-file
statute does not violate the uniform operation of laws provision since the
legislature removed prosecutorial discretion regarding which juveniles must be
charged under the direct-file statute and the state has a legitimate need to 'try
certain violent juveniles as adults." Mohi, 901 P.2d at 999.
Additionally, Angilau asserts that the right might be properly based in
Article I section 27 of the Utah Constitution, which states that "[fjrequent
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual rights
and the perpetuity of free government." Angilau's Brief at 40. However, when
reviewed by this court, this constitutional provision has been merely combined
with other provisions in an attempt to bolster the other. See e.g. Rackley v.
Fairview Care Centers, Inc, 2001 UT 32, f 20, 23 P.3d 1022 (holding that Article
I, section 1 of the Utah Constitution combined with Article I, section 27 did not
support a right for a care facility resident to manage her own funds). On its own,
this provision is inadequate to form the basis of the right Angilau seeks.
Angilau fails to articulate a plausible basis for ruling that he has a
constitutional right to be treated as a juvenile and consequently cannot show that
26

MohVs holding, that no such right exists, "was originally erroneous or is no longer
sound because of changing conditions[.]" Bennett, 2000 UT 34, \ 8 (quotations
and citations omitted). Hence, Angilau's request to create such a right should be
denied.
CONCLUSION
Angilau's detention at the Jail is lawful under the current statutory scheme
which is presumed to be constitutional. The Juvenile Standards as promulgated by
DJJS are inapplicable to adult jails. Angilau's detention at the Jail is lawful under
both the Utah and the United States Constitutions.
Finally, this Court should dismiss Angilau's request for the creation of a
new constitutional right since he failed to brief and argue the issue in the lower
court. Should this Court reach the merits of this argument, Angilau has not
overcome the significant burden of persuasion required to overrule this Court's
holding in Mohi that no such right exists.
Wherefore, the Sheriff requests that this Court to affirm the denial of the
petition for extraordinary relief.
DATED this ^ 2 S

day of November, 2009.
LOHRA L. MILLER
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
By:

TJavid A. Johnson
Deputy District Attorney
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ADDENDA

§ 62A-7-101, U.C.A. (2008)
62A-7-101. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Authority" means the Youth Parole Authority, established in accordance with
Section 62A-7-501.
(2) "Board" means the Board of Juvenile Justice Services established in accordance
with Section 62A-1-105.
(3) "Community-based program" means a nonsecure residential or nonresidential
program designated to supervise and rehabilitate youth offenders in the least restrictive
setting, consistent with public safety, and designated or operated by or under contract
with the division.
(4) "Control" means the authority to detain, restrict, and supervise a youth in a manner
consistent with public safety and the well being of the youth and division employees.
(5) "Court" means the juvenile court.
(6) "Delinquent act" is an act which would constitute a felony or a misdemeanor if
committed by an adult.
(7) "Detention" means secure detention or home detention.
(8) "Detention center" means a facility established in accordance with Title 62A,
Chapter 7, Part 2, Detention Facilities.
(9) "Director" means the director of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services.
(10) "Discharge" means a written order of the Youth Parole Authority that removes a
youth offender from its jurisdiction.
(11) "Division" means the Division of Juvenile Justice Services.
(12) "Home detention" means predispositional placement of a child in the child's
home or a surrogate home with the consent of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian
for conduct by a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or
postdispositional placement pursuant to Subsection 78A-6-117(2)(f) or 78A-6-1101(3).
(13) "Observation and assessment program" means a service program operated or
purchased by the division, that is responsible for temporary custody of youth offenders
for observation.
(14) "Parole" means a conditional release of a youth offender from residency in a
secure facility to live outside that facility under the supervision of the Division of
Juvenile Justice Services or other person designated by the division.
(15) "Receiving center" means a nonsecure, nonresidential program established by the
division or under contract with the division that is responsible for juveniles taken into
custody by a law enforcement officer for status offenses or delinquent acts, but who do
not meet the criteria for admission to secure detention or shelter.
(16) "Rescission" means a written order of the Youth Parole Authority that rescinds a
parole date.
(17) "Revocation of parole" means a written order of the Youth Parole Authority that
terminates parole supervision of a youth offender and directs return of the youth offender
to the custody of a secure facility because of a violation of the conditions of parole.
(18) "Runaway" means a youth who willfully leaves the residence of a parent or
guardian without the permission of the parent or guardian.
(19) "Secure detention" means predisposition placement in a facility operated by or

under contract with the division, for conduct by a child who is alleged to have committed
a delinquent act.
(20) "Secure facility" means any facility operated by or under contract with the
division, that provides 24-hour supervision and confinement for youth offenders
committed to the division for custody and rehabilitation.
(21) "Shelter" means the temporary care of children in physically unrestricted
facilities pending court disposition or transfer to another jurisdiction.
(22) "Temporary custody" means control and responsibility of nonadjudicated youth
until the youth can be released to the parent, guardian, a responsible adult, or to an
appropriate agency.
(23) "Termination" means a written order of the Youth Parole Authority that
terminates a youth offender from parole.
(24) "Ungovernable" means a youth in conflict with a parent or guardian, and the
conflict:
(a) results in behavior that is beyond the control or ability of the youth, or the parent
or guardian, to manage effectively;
(b) poses a threat to the safety or well-being of the youth, the family, or others; or
(c) results in the situations in both Subsections (24)(a) and (b).
(25) "Work program" means a public or private service work project established and
administered by the division for youth offenders for the purpose of rehabilitation,
education, and restitution to victims.
(26) "Youth offender" means a person 12 years of age or older, and who has not
reached 21 years of age, committed or admitted by the juvenile court to the custody, care,
and jurisdiction of the division, for confinement in a secure facility or supervision in the
community, following adjudication for a delinquent act which would constitute a felony
or misdemeanor if committed by an adult.
(27) (a) "Youth services" means services provided in an effort to resolve family
conflict:
(i) for families in crisis when a minor is ungovernable or runaway; or
(ii) involving a minor and the minor's parent or guardian.
(b) These services include efforts to:
(i) resolve family conflict;
(ii) maintain or reunite minors with their families; and
(iii) divert minors from entering or escalating in the juvenile justice system;
(c) The services may provide:
(i) crisis intervention;
(ii) short-term shelter;
(iii) time out placement; and
(iv) family counseling.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session

§ 62A-7-102, U.C.A. (2008)
62A-7-102. Creation of division — Jurisdiction.
There is created the Division of Juvenile Justice Services within the department, under
the administration and supervision of the executive director, and under the policy
direction of the board. The division has jurisdiction over all youth committed to it
pursuant to Section 78A-6-117.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session

§ 62A-7-104, U.C.A. (2008)
Please see Appellant's Addendum.

§ 62A-7-201 U.C.A. (2008)
Please see Appellant's Addendum.
§ 63G-3-102, U.C.A. (2008)
63G-3-102. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Administrative record" means information an agency relies upon when making a
rule under this chapter including:
(a) the proposed rule, change in the proposed rule, and the rule analysis form;
(b) the public comment received and recorded by the agency during the public
comment period;
(c) the agency's response to the public comment;
(d) the agency's analysis of the public comment; and
(e) the agency's report of its decision-making process.
(2) "Agency" means each state board, authority, commission, institution, department,
division, officer, or other state government entity other than the Legislature, its
committees, the political subdivisions of the state, or the courts, which is authorized or
required by law to make rules, adjudicate, grant or withhold licenses, grant or withhold
relief from legal obligations, or perform other similar actions or duties delegated by law.
(3) "Bulletin" means the Utah State Bulletin.
(4) "Catchline" means a short summary of each section, part, rule, or title of the code
that follows the section, part, rule, or title reference placed before the text of the rule and
serves the same function as boldface in legislation as described in Section 68-3-13.
(5) "Code" means the body of all effective rules as compiled and organized by the
division and entitled "Utah Administrative Code."
(6) "Director" means the director of the Division of Administrative Rules.
(7) "Division" means the Division of Administrative Rules.
(8) "Effective" means operative and enforceable.
(9) (a) "File" means to submit a document to the division as prescribed by the
division.
(b) "Filing date" means the day and time the document is recorded as received by the

division.
(10) "Interested person" means any person affected by or interested in a proposed rule,
amendment to an existing rule, or a nonsubstantive change made under Section 63G-3402.
(11) "Order" means an agency action that determines the legal rights, duties,
privileges, immunities, or other interests of one or more specific persons, but not a class
of persons.
(12) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
governmental entity, or public or private organization of any character other than an
agency.
(13) "Publication" or "publish" means making a rule available to the public by
including the rule or a summary of the rule in the bulletin.
(14) "Publication date" means the inscribed date of the bulletin.
(15) "Register" may include an electronic database.
(16) (a) "Rule" means an agency's written statement that:
(i) is explicitly or implicitly required by state or federal statute or other applicable law;
(ii) implements or interprets a state or federal legal mandate; and
(iii) applies to a class of persons or another agency.
(b) "Rule" includes the amendment or repeal of an existing rule.
(c) "Rule" does not mean:
(i) orders;
(ii) an agency's written statement that applies only to internal management and that
does
not restrict the legal rights of a public class of persons or another agency;
(iii) the governor's executive orders or proclamations;
(iv) opinions issued by the attorney general's office;
(v) declaratory rulings issued by the agency according to Section 63G-4-503 except as
required by Section 63G-3-201;
(vi) rulings by an agency in adjudicative proceedings, except as required by
Subsection 63G-3-20H6); or
(vii) an agency written statement that is in violation of any state or federal law.
(17) "Rule analysis" means the format prescribed by the division to summarize and
analyze rules.
(18) "Small business" means a business employing fewer than 50 persons.
(19) "Substantive change" means a change in a rule that affects the application or
results of agency actions.
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78A-6-117. Adjudication of jurisdiction of juvenile court — Disposition of cases —
Enumeration of possible court orders — Considerations of court -- Obtaining DNA
sample.
(1) (a) When a minor is found to come within the provisions of Section 78A-6-103,
the court shall so adjudicate. The court shall make a finding of the facts upon which it
bases its jurisdiction over the minor. However, in cases within the provisions of
Subsection 78A-6-103(l), findings of fact are not necessary.
(b) If the court adjudicates a minor for a crime of violence or an offense in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5, Weapons, it shall order that notice of the adjudication be
provided to the school superintendent of the district in which the minor resides or attends
school. Notice shall be made to the district superintendent within three days of the
adjudication and shall include:
(i) the specific offenses for which the minor was adjudicated; and
(ii) if available, if the victim:
(A) resides in the same school district as the minor; or
(B) attends the same school as the minor.
(2) Upon adjudication the court may make the following dispositions by court order:
(a) (i) The court may place the minor on probation or under protective supervision in
the minor's own home and upon conditions determined by the court, including
compensatory service as provided in Subsection (2)(m)(iii).
(ii) The court may place the minor in state supervision with the probation department
of the court, under the legal custody of:
(A) the minor's parent or guardian;
(B) the Division of Juvenile Justice Services; or
(C) the Division of Child and Family Services.
(iii) If the court orders probation or state supervision, the court shall direct that notice
of its order be provided to designated persons in the local law enforcement agency and
the school or transferee school, if applicable, that the minor attends. The designated
persons may receive the information for purposes of the minor's supervision and student

safety.
(iv) Any employee of the local law enforcement agency and the school that the minor
attends who discloses the court's order of probation is not:
(A) civilly liable except when the disclosure constitutes fraud or willful misconduct as
provided in Section 63G-7-202; and
(B) civilly or criminally liable except when the disclosure constitutes a knowing
violation of Section 63G-2-801.
(b) The court may place the minor in the legal custody of a relative or other suitable
person, with or without probation or protective supervision, but the juvenile court may
not assume the function of developing foster home services.
(c) (i) The court may:
(A) vest legal custody of the minor in the Division of Child and Family Services,
Division of Juvenile Justice Services, or the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental
Health; and
(B) order the Department of Human Services to provide dispositional
recommendations and services.
(ii) For minors who may qualify for services from two or more divisions within the
Department of Human Services, the court may vest legal custody with the department.
(iii) (A) A minor who is committed to the custody of the Division of Child and Family
Services on grounds other than abuse or neglect is subject to the provisions of Title 78 A,
Chapter 6, Part 4, Minors in Custody on Grounds Other Than Abuse or Neglect, and Title
62A, Chapter 4a, Part 2A, Minors in Custody on Grounds Other Than Abuse or Neglect.
(B) Prior to the court entering an order to place a minor in the custody of the Division
of Child and Family Services on grounds other than abuse or neglect, the court shall
provide the division with notice of the hearing no later than five days before the time
specified for the hearing so the division may attend the hearing.
(C) Prior to committing a child to the custody of the Division of Child and Family
Services, the court shall make a finding as to what reasonable efforts have been attempted
to prevent the child's removal from the child's home.
(d) (i) The court may commit a minor to the Division of Juvenile Justice Services for
secure confinement.
(ii) A minor under the jurisdiction of the court solely on the ground of abuse, neglect,
or dependency under Subsection 78A-6-103(l)(c) may not be committed to the Division
of Juvenile Justice Services.
(e) The court may commit a minor, subject to the court retaining continuing
jurisdiction over the minor, to the temporary custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice
Services for observation and evaluation for a period not to exceed 45 days, which period
may be extended up to 15 days at the request of the director of the Division of Juvenile
Justice Services.
(f) (i) The court may commit a minor to a place of detention or an alternative to
detention for a period not to exceed 30 days subject to the court retaining continuing
jurisdiction over the minor. This commitment may be stayed or suspended upon
conditions ordered by the court.
(ii) This Subsection (2)(f) applies only to a minor adjudicated for:
(A) an act which if committed by an adult would be a criminal offense; or
(B) contempt of court under Section 78A-6-1101.

(g) The court may vest legal custody of an abused, neglected, or dependent minor in
the Division of Child and Family Services or any other appropriate person in accordance
with the requirements and procedures of Title 78 A, Chapter 6, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect,
and Dependency Proceedings.
(h) The court may place a minor on a ranch or forestry camp, or similar facility for
care and also for work, if possible, if the person, agency, or association operating the
facility has been approved or has otherwise complied with all applicable state and local
laws. A minor placed in a forestry camp or similar facility may be required to work on
fire prevention, forestation and reforestation, recreational works, forest roads, and on
other works on or off the grounds of the facility and may be paid wages, subject to the
approval of and under conditions set by the court.
(i) (i) The court may order a minor to repair, replace, or otherwise make restitution for
damage or loss caused by the minor's wrongful act, including costs of treatment as stated
in Section 78A-6-321 and impose fines in limited amounts.
(ii) The court may also require a minor to reimburse an individual, entity, or
governmental agency who offered and paid a reward to a person or persons for providing
information resulting in a court adjudication that the minor is within the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court due to the commission of a criminal offense.
(iii) If a minor is returned to this state under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles, the
court may order the minor to make restitution for costs expended by any governmental
entity for
the return.
(j) The court may issue orders necessary for the collection of restitution and fines
ordered by the court, including garnishments, wage withholdings, and executions.
(k) (i) The court may through its probation department encourage the development of
employment or work programs to enable minors to fulfill their obligations under
Subsection (2)(i) and for other purposes considered desirable by the court.
(ii) Consistent with the order of the court, the probation officer may permit a minor
found to be within the jurisdiction of the court to participate in a program of work
restitution or compensatory service in lieu of paying part or all of the fine imposed by the
court.
(1) (i) In violations of traffic laws within the court's jurisdiction, the court may, in
addition to any other disposition authorized by this section:
(A) restrain the minor from driving for periods of time the court considers necessary;
and
(B) take possession of the minor's driver license.
(ii) The court may enter any other disposition under Subsection (2)(l)(i); however, the
suspension of driving privileges for an offense under Section 78A-6-606 are governed
only by Section 78A-6-606.
(m) (i) When a minor is found within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under
Section 78A-6-103 because of violating Section 58-37-8, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act,
the court shall, in addition to any fines or fees otherwise imposed, order that the minor
perform a minimum of 20 hours, but no more than 100 hours, of compensatory service.
Satisfactory completion of an approved substance abuse prevention or treatment program

may be credited by the court as compensatory service hours.
(ii) When a minor is found within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Section
78A-6-103 because of a violation of Section 32A-l 2-209 or Subsection 76-9-701(1), the
court may, upon the first adjudication, and shall, upon a second or subsequent
adjudication, order that the minor perform a minimum of 20 hours, but no more than 100
hours of compensatory service, in addition to any fines or fees otherwise imposed.
Satisfactory completion of an approved substance abuse prevention or treatment program
may be credited by the court as compensatory service hours.
(iii) When a minor is found within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Section
78A-6-103 because of a violation of Section 76-6-106 or 76-6-206 using graffiti, the
court may order the minor to clean up graffiti created by the minor or any other person at
a time and place within the jurisdiction of the court. Compensatory service required under
this section may be performed in the presence and under the direct supervision of the
minor's parent or legal guardian. The parent or legal guardian shall report completion of
the order to the court. The minor or the minor's parent or legal guardian, if applicable,
shall be responsible for removal costs as determined under Section 76-6-107, unless
waived by the court for good cause. The court may also require the minor to perform
other alternative forms of restitution or repair to the damaged property pursuant to
Subsection 77-18-1(8).
(A) For a first adjudication, the court may require the minor to clean up graffiti for not
less than eight hours.
(B) For a second adjudication, the court may require the minor to clean up graffiti for
not less than 16 hours.
(C) For a third adjudication, the court may require the minor to clean up graffiti for
not
less than 24 hours.
(n) (i) Subject to Subsection (2)(n)(iii), the court may order that a minor:
(A) be examined or treated by a physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, or psychologist; or
(B) receive other special care.
(ii) For purposes of receiving the examination, treatment, or care described in
Subsection (2)(n)(i), the court may place the minor in a hospital or other suitable facility.
(iii) In determining whether to order the examination, treatment, or care described in
Subsection (2)(n)(i), the court shall consider:
(A) the desires of the minor;
(B) if the minor is under the age of 18, the desires of the parents or guardian of the
minor; and
(C) whether the potential benefits of the examination, treatment, or care outweigh the
potential risks and side-effects, including behavioral disturbances, suicidal ideation, brain
function impairment, or emotional or physical harm resulting from the compulsory nature
of the examination, treatment, or care.
(o) (i) The court may appoint a guardian for the minor if it appears necessary in the
interest of the minor, and may appoint as guardian a public or private institution or
agency in which legal custody of the minor is vested.
(ii) In placing a minor under the guardianship or legal custody of an individual or of a
private agency or institution, the court shall give primary consideration to the welfare of

the minor. When practicable, the court may take into consideration the religious
preferences of the minor and of a child's parents.
(p) (i) In support of a decree under Section 78A-6-103, the court may order reasonable
conditions to be complied with by a minor's parents or guardian, a minor, a minor's
custodian, or any other person who has been made a party to the proceedings. Conditions
may include:
(A) parent-time by the parents or one parent;
(B) restrictions on the minor's associates;
(C) restrictions on the minor's occupation and other activities; and
(D) requirements to be observed by the parents or custodian.
(ii) A minor whose parents or guardians successfully complete a family or other
counseling program may be credited by the court for detention, confinement, or probation
time.
(q) The court may order the child to be committed to the physical custody of a local
mental health authority, in accordance with the procedures and requirements of Title
62A, Chapter 15, Part 7, Commitment of Persons Under Age 18 to Division of Substance
Abuse and Mental Health.
(r) (i) The court may make an order committing a minor within the court's jurisdiction
to the Utah State Developmental Center if the minor has mental retardation in accordance
with the provisions of Title 62A, Chapter 5, Part 3, Admission to Mental Retardation
Facility.
(ii) The court shall follow the procedure applicable in the district courts with respect
to judicial commitments to the Utah State Developmental Center when ordering a
commitment under Subsection (2)(r)(i).
(s) The court may terminate all parental rights upon a finding of compliance with the
provisions of Title 78 A, Chapter 6, Part 5, Termination of Parental Rights Act.
(t) The court may make any other reasonable orders for the best interest of the minor
or as required for the protection of the public, except that a child may not be committed
to jail or
prison.
(u) The court may combine the dispositions listed in this section if they are
compatible.
(v) Before depriving any parent of custody, the court shall give due consideration to
the rights of parents concerning their child. The court may transfer custody of a minor to
another person, agency, or institution in accordance with the requirements and procedures
of Title 78A, Chapter 6, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings.
(w) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(y)(i), an order under this section for
probation or placement of a minor with an individual or an agency shall include a date
certain for a review of the case by the court. A new date shall be set upon each review.
(x) In reviewing foster home placements, special attention shall be given to making
adoptable children available for adoption without delay.
(y) (i) The juvenile court may enter an order of permanent custody and guardianship
with an individual or relative of a child where the court has previously acquired
jurisdiction as a result of an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency. The juvenile
court may enter an order for child support on behalf of the child against the natural or

adoptive parents of the child.
(ii) Orders under Subsection (2)(y)(i):
(A) shall remain in effect until the child reaches majority;
(B) are not subject to review under Section 78A-6-118; and
(C) may be modified by petition or motion as provided in Section 78A-6-1103.
(iii) Orders permanently terminating the rights of a parent, guardian, or custodian and
permanent orders of custody and guardianship do not expire with a termination of
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
(3) In addition to the dispositions described in Subsection (2), when a minor comes
within the court's jurisdiction, the minor may be given a choice by the court to serve in
the National Guard in lieu of other sanctions, provided:
(a) the minor meets the current entrance qualifications for service in the National
Guard as determined by a recruiter, whose determination is final;
(b) the minor is not under the jurisdiction of the court for any act that:
(i) would be a felony if committed by an adult;
(ii) is a violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act; or
(iii) was committed with a weapon; and
(c) the court retains jurisdiction over the minor under conditions set by the court and
agreed upon by the recruiter or the unit commander to which the minor is eventually
assigned.
(4) (a) A DNA specimen shall be obtained from a minor who is under the jurisdiction
of the court as described in Subsection 53-10-403(3). The specimen shall be obtained by
designated employees of the court or, if the minor is in the legal custody of the Division
of Juvenile Justice Services, then by designated employees of the division under
Subsection 53-10-404(5)(b).
(b) The responsible agency shall ensure that employees designated to collect the saliva
DNA specimens receive appropriate training and that the specimens are obtained in
accordance with accepted protocol.
(c) Reimbursements paid under Subsection 53-10-404(2)(a) shall be placed in the
DNA Specimen Restricted Account created in Section 53-10-407.
(d) Payment of the reimbursement is second in priority to payments the minor is
ordered to make for restitution under this section and treatment under Section 78A-6-321.
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kted "shall, withinfivedays" before "file" in the
prat sentence of Subsection (4)(d).

?8-3a-22.5. Restricted account — Nonjudicial Adjustment
Account.
(1) There is created within the General Fund a restricted account known as
e "Nonjudicial Adjustment Account"
(2) (a) The account shall be funded from the financial penalty established
under Subsection 78-3a-22(3)(c)(i).
(b) The juvenile court shall deposit all monies collected as a result of
penalties assessed as part of the nonjudicial adjustment of a case in the
account.
(c) The account shall be used to pay the expenses of juvenile community
service, victim restitution, and diversion programs.

h

History: C. 1953, 78-3a-22.5, enacted by
, 1992, ch. 272, § 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch. 272

became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

|78-3a-25. Felony committed by juvenile — Hearing and
certification to district court — Factors considered as to waiver of jurisdiction by juvenile
court — Jurisdiction of juvenile court — Termination and recall of jurisdiction.
(1) (a) If the petition in the case of a juvenile 14 years of age or older alleges
he committed an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an
adult, and if the court after full investigation and a hearing finds that it
would be contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of the public to
retain jurisdiction, the court may enter an order:
(i) certifying that finding;
(ii) directing that the juvenile be held for criminal proceedings in
the district court; and
(iii) directing that a hearing be held before a committing magistrate as in other felony cases,
(b) The provisions of Section 78-3a-35 and other provisions relating to
proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this
section to the extent they are pertinent.
(2) In considering whether or not to waive jurisdiction over the juvenile, the
juvenile court shall consider the following factors:
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the
community requires isolation of the juvenile beyond that afforded by
juvenile facilities;
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the juvenile in
concert with two or more persons under circumstances which would
subject the juvenile to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203.1 were
he an adult;
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated, or willful manner;
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons;
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(e) the maturity of the juvenile as determined by considerations of his
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;
(f) the record and previous history of the juvenile;
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the juvenile by use of facilities
available to the juvenile court;
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults who
will be charged with a crime in the district court;
(i) whether the juvenile used a firearm in the commission of an offense;
and
(j) whether the juvenile possessed a dangerous weapon on or about
school premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5.
(3) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in
Subsection (2) is discretionary with the court.
(4) The juvenile court judge may enter an order certifying a juvenile to stand
trial as an adult upon making a finding of any one or more of those factors set
forth in Subsection (2).
(5) (a) The certification hearing is a dispositional proceeding, and while the
juvenile court may hear evidence of the crime to establish there is a
reasonable relationship between the charge and the juvenile, the court
need not hold a preliminary hearing to establish probable cause that the
juvenile committed the offense.
(b) (i) Written reports and other materials relating to the juvenile's
mental, physical, educational, and social history shall be considered
by the court.
(ii) If requested by the juvenile, the juvenile's parent, guardian, or
other interested party, the court shall require the person or agency
preparing the report and other material to appear and be subject to
both direct and cross-examination.
(6) (a) When a petition in the case of a juvenile 16 years of age or older
alleges any class of criminal homicide, attempted criminal homicide, or
any other offense that would be a capital offense or a first degree felony if
committed by an adult, the juvenile is subject to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court except under Subsection (6)(b) or (7).
(b) If a grand jury returns an indictment on the charge or a county
attorney, district attorney, or attorney general files a criminal information,
the juvenile court is divested of jurisdiction under Section 78-3a-16. The
charge shall be made and the proceedings regarding the charge shall be
conducted in every respect as if the juvenile were an adult. A copy of the
information or indictment shall be filed immediately in the juvenile court
as notice to that court.
(7) (a) The juvenile court is divested of jurisdiction under Section 78-3a-16
if a grand jury returns an indictment or a county attorney, district
attorney, or attorney general files a criminal information on a juvenile 16
years of age or older on:
(i) the charge of murder;
(ii) the use of a dangerous weapon in the commission of a criminal
homicide, attempted criminal homicide, or any other offense that
would be a capital offense or a first degree felony if committed by an
adult; or
(iii) an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which
would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the juvenile has been
28

JUVENILE COURTS

78-3a-25

previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of
a dangerous weapon which also would have been a felony if committed
by an adult.
(b) The charge shall be made and the proceedings regarding the charge
shall be conducted in every respect as if the juvenile were an adult. A copy
of the information or indictment shall be filed immediately in the juvenile
court as notice to the court.
(c) There shall be no possibility to recall jurisdiction to the juvenile
court under Subsection (7).
(8) When a juvenile has been certified to the adult judicial system or when
a criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a committing magistrate charging the juvenile with an offense
under Subsection (6) or (7), the jurisdiction of the Division of Youth Corrections
is terminated, and the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the juvenile is
terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged
against him, except as provided in Subsections (10) and (11).
(9) (a) Upon conviction, a judge may:
(i) impose the penalties set forth in the criminal code;
(ii) impose the penalties set forth in the criminal code and place the
juvenile with the Division of Youth Corrections temporarily, subject to
periodic review for purposes of transferring the juvenile from the
Division of Youth Corrections to the Department of Corrections to
serve the remainder of the sentence; or
(hi) commit the juvenile to the care, custody, and jurisdiction of the
Division of Youth Corrections.
(b) A juvenile may be convicted under this section on the charges filed
or on any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode.
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-16 and the Division of Youth
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
juvenile when:
(a) a magistrate determines there is insufficient probable cause for the
juvenile to stand trial on the allegation or amended allegation;
(b) there is an acquittal or finding of not guilty or dismissal of the
charges; or
(c) the matter is recalled under Subsection (11).
(11) (a) The juvenile or his parents, guardian, or custodian may request a
hearing in juvenile court to recall jurisdiction to the juvenile court by filing
a motion in the juvenile court, The motion shall be filed within ten
calendar days from the date of the filing of the information. Upon receiving
the motion, the juvenile court has jurisdiction to conduct a hearing and
rule upon the motion to recall juvenile court jurisdiction. A hearing shall
be held on the request within 15 calendar days of the filing.
(b) In determining whether or not to recall jurisdiction the juvenile
court judge shall consider:
(i) the juvenile's chronological age;
(ii) the juvenile's legal record; and
(hi) the seriousness of the charge.
(c) The juvenile court judge may deny the motion upon a finding of one
or more of the factors listed in Subsection (ll)(b).
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(d) If the juvenile court i-ecalls jurisdiction under this subsection, the
juvenile shall be returned to the juvenile court for further proceedings,
which may include certification.
(12) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-16 and the Division of Youth
Corrections shall not regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile if the juvenile is under the district court's jurisdiction
pursuant to Subsection (7).
History: L. 1965, ch. 165, § 24; 1971, ch.
134, § 3, formerly C. 1953, 55-10-86, redes.
as 78-3a-25; L, 1981, ch. 163, § 1; 1983, ch.
Bl, § 1; 1986, ch. 159, § 1; 1990, ch. 71, § 1;
1991, ch. 100, § 1; 1992, ch. 101, § 4; 1993,
ch. 38, § 109; 1993 (2nd S.S.), ch. 12, § 1;
1993 (2nd S.S.), ch, 15, § 3; 1994, ch. 12,
§ 116; 1994, ch. 94, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsections (2)(i) and (j) and made related stylistic
changes; in Subsection (5), designated the former second sentence as Subsection (a) and the
former first sentence as Subsection (b); deleted
former Subsection (11), a savings clause in case
)f unconstitutionality of a subsection, and de.eted a reference to that subsection from Subsection (7); and made stylistic changes in Subjections (l)(a) and (6)(a).
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993,
.nserted "or district attorney" in the first sentence in Subsection (6)(b).
The 1993 (2nd S.S.) amendment by ch. 12,
affective October 21, 1993, added "attorney
General" to the first sentence of Subsection
6)(b) and made stylistic changes; added Subjection (7), renumbering the following subsec;ions and correcting internal references accordngly; and rewrote Subsection (9).
The 1993 (2nd S.S.) amendment by ch. 15,

effective October 21, 1993, divided Subsection
(5)(b) into Subsections (5)(b)(i) and (ii), making
stylistic changes and deleting "if reasonably
available" after "the person" in Subsection
(5)(b)(ii); added "or (7)(a) or (b)M to the end of
Subsection (6)(a); added Subsections (7) and
(12), renumbering former Subsections (7)
through (10) as Subsections (8) through (11)
and making related reference changes; rewrote
Subsection (9); and made stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 12, effective May
2, 1994, made stylistic changes in Subsections
(2)(i) and (j).
The 1994 amendment by ch. 94, effective May
2, 1994, in Subsection (l)(b) substituted "juvenile cases" for "juvenile's cases"; deleted "(a) or
(b)" after "Subsection (6)(b) or (7)" at the end of
Subsection (6)(a); and inserted "involving the
use of a dangerous weapon" near the beginning
of Subsection (7)(a)(iii).
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1993 (2nd
S.S.), ch. 15, § 4 provides: "If any provision of
this section, or the application of any provision
to any person or circumstance, is held invalid,
the remainder of this section is given effect
without the invalid provision or application."

NOTES TO DECISIONS
factors considered.

personal knowledge of the officer was within
the discretion of the juvenile court at a certification hearing and was in line with the requirements of this section. State v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d
314 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

—Record and previous history.
Consideration of a study and testimony by a
probation officer based on police reports and not
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Journal of Contemporary Law. — State ex
'el. v, E.G.T.: Waiving Childhood Goodbye, 18 J.
^ontemp. L. 159 (1992).
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§ 78-3a-30(9), U.C.A. (1994)
Please see Appellant's Addendum.
§ 78-3a-114, U.C.A. (2008)
Please see Appellant's Addendum.
§ 78-3a-509(ll), U.C.A. (1996)
§78-3a-509(ll)(11) A minor held for criminal proceedings under Section 78-3a-602 or 78-3a-603
may be detained in a jail or other place of detention used for adults charged with
crime.
Article I § 27, Utah Constitution
Please see Appellant's Addendum
Article VI § 26, Utah Constitution
Article VI, Section 26. [Private laws forbidden.]
No private or special law shall be enacted where a general law can be
applicable.

